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Audrey L. Barrett* The Structure of Dialogue: Exploring
Habermas' Discourse Theory to Explain
the "Magic" and Potential of Restorative
Justice Processes
The theory of restorative justice has always lagged behind practice. As such,
gaps in theory have developed, existed over time and continue to exist today
particularly in terms of explaining the so-called "magic" that occurs within the
encounter process. By exploring the theories of Jorgen Habermas, it is suggested
that new frameworks can be developed that can help theorists think about and
explain the experiences central to restorative processes. This paper focuses on
Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics and communicative action as a means
to better understand the workings within the encounter process that give rise to
common understanding, agreement, learning, and strengthened relationships.
La thdorie de la justice rdparatrice a toujours 6t & la remorque de la pratique. Par
consdquent, des failles sont apparues, et les 6carts qui se sont creusds au fil du
temps existent toujours, particulibrement pour ce qui est dexpliquer la reaction
qualifide de < magique - qui suit le processus transactionnel. 1/ est sugg6r6 que,
grice . l'dtude des th6ories de JOrgen Habermas, il serait possible de crder
de nouveaux cadres d'action qui pourraient aider les thdoriciens & se pencher
sur les experiences au cceur du processus de rdparation et j les expliquer.
L'article examine la th6orie de Habermas sur la pragmatique universelle et les
6noncs performatifs comme moyens pour mieux comprendre les mdcanismes
du processus transactionnel qui m~nent & une comprdhension commune, J
'entente, 6 l'apprentissage et 6 des relations plus solides.
* Graduate Fellow, Nova Scotia Restorative Justice-Community University Research Alliance.
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Archibald, Florian Bail, the partners and university collaborators within the Nova Scotia Restorative
Justice-Community University Research Alliance (NSRJ-CURA), and the anonymous reviewers
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and writing of this paper. She gave me the restorative foundation upon which this work is built, and
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336 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Introduction
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within the restorative justice process
1. Learning potential
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III. Explaining the restorative encounter process
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2. The signficance ofHabermas'theories for restorative justice
Introduction
An important aspect of the restorative justice process is a commitment to
the bringing together of all parties involved in a wrong in a face-to-face
encounter, to allow the parties to dialogue about the wrong committed and
search for ways to make the wrong right. Despite encounter being at the
heart of any restorative justice process, what happens within or during the
face-to-face restorative process remains to some extent ambiguous and
unclear. Authors have described the experiences witnessed in encounters
such as strengthened social relationships, personal transformation,
learning, and coming to a common understanding.' To date, however,
there is little explanation of the basic workings of the encounter and how
it produces the above-noted experiences. Theorists have instead often
simply skimmed over this element with vague terminology, or have taken
a romanticized approach referring simply to the so-called "magic" that
1. Daniel Van Ness & Karen Strong, Restoring Justice, 2d ed (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing,
2002) at 59-61 and 70; Barbara Raye & Ann Warner Roberts, "Restorative Processes" in Gerry
Johnstone & Daniel W Van Ness, Handbook of Restorative Justice (Devon: Willan Publishing,
2007) at 217; Mara Schiff, "Satisfying the Needs and Interests of Stakeholders" in Johnstone & Van
Ness, ibid at 230; Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W Van Ness, "The Meaning of Restorative Justice"
in Johnstone & Van Ness, ibid at 16 [Johnstone & Van Ness, "Meaning of Restorative Justice"];
Gabrielle Maxwell, "The Defining Features of a Restorative Justice Approach to Conflict" in Gabrielle
Maxwell & James Liu, eds, Restorative Justice and Practices in New Zealand: Towards a Restorative
Society (Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 2007) at 11.
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happens within or during an encounter.2 Still others suggest that there
is "something significant" going on, but acknowledge that we are still
struggling to explain it. As Paul McCold suggests:
Facilitators of restorative processes regularly observe a personal and
social transformation occur during the course of the process. There is
often the strong sense that something sigmificant is occurring which has
very little to do with the facilitator and operates at a subconscious level
among the participants.
Today we struggle to understand what it is we see, although those
observing the transformations that can occur in restorative processes
would agree, we "know it when we see it." A shared language will
eventually develop from how we interpret what we see and how we
express those visions to others.'
Although never writing on the topic of restorative justice, the theories
of German philosopher and sociologist Jilrgen Habermas may provide a
helpful framework or perspective from which to explore, further examine,
and begin to understand the "something significant" that is occurring during
the encounter process. In particular I believe that Habermas' linguistic
or discourse theories of universal pragmatics and communicative action
may help us begin to articulate the structures at work within language that
explain how the important experiences witnessed in the encounter process
are achieved. I have turned to Habermas' concepts of universal pragmatics
and communicative action in particular. These theories aim at explaining
how language can be employed to achieve understanding and how they
give rise to individuals coming to agreement and coordinating their action
correspondingly. Given that the crux of encounter is to employ dialogue
so that individuals can understand the harm that has occurred and together
come to agreement regarding what measures need to be taken to right
2. Heather Strang, "Justice for Victims of Young Offenders: The Centrality of Emotional Harm
and Restoration" in Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, eds, Restorative Conferencing for Young
Offenders (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) at 186; Michael Hadley, The Spiritual Roots ofRestorative
Justice (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001) at 10 and 51; Harry Blagg, "Restorative
Visions and Restorative Justice Practices: Conferencing, Ceremony and Reconciliation in Australia"
(1998-1999) 10 Current Issues Crim Just 5 at 11.
3. Paul McCold, "Toward a Holistic Vision of Restorative Juvenile Justice: A Reply to the
Maximalist Model" (2000) 3:4 Contemporary Justice Review 357 at 359 and 363 [emphasis added].
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the wrong, the connections between the two theoretical constructs seem
highly relevant.'
Although Habermas' theories provide a useful framework that can help
expand our understanding of restorative justice, the author nonetheless
acknowledges that Habermas' work has several weaknesses that should be
kept in mind. The first weakness is that Habermas' theories of universal
pragmatics and communicative action are largely utopian in that they
envision an ideal situation or context as opposed to what exists in actual
fact. For example, Habermas articulates the concept of an ideal speech
situation. Although Habermas moved away from this concept in later
years, that move in and of itself makes the point that his original theories
are overly idealistic. Another example is Habermas' requirement that
persons be oriented to understanding in order to facilitate communicative
action. Although this is important to his theory, it is often absent in human
discourse when fears, insecurities, vulnerabilities, and egos overtake the
conversation.
This point leads into the second weakness in Habermas' theories: they
rely too heavily on rational thought. Habermas is known as a modernist
who believed that modernity was not dead and could be salvaged instead
of moving to a post-modern persuasion. When his theories are applied
to specific situations such as restorative justice processes, however, it
becomes clear that humans do not usually behave as rationally as Habermas
might theorize. The rationality that Habermas envisions in his writings
presents as sober thought, when in reality persons, especially those in
conflict, rely significantly on their feelings and emotions and create and
respond to a myriad of both verbal and non-verbal dynamics in dialogue
(including, importantly, the issue of power dynamics present in nearly
every discourse).
The last weakness that I wish to note, again stems from the previous,
that is that Habermas' theories tend to be highly ethnocentric in nature.
Many cultures, especially those where restorative justice and other dialogue
4. It is acknowledged here at the outset that Habermas provides only one of many perspectives from
which we should examine and better understand restorative justice. Offering this perspective, albeit
with limitations, is nonetheless important in that it opens up and offers practitioners and theorists a
different way of thinking of what occurs within restorative justice practice. It is the author's hope
that this article can help practitioners and theorists to further conceptualize and reflect on current
practice from a new theoretical perspective so as to further refine, develop, and improve practice. By
using Habermas' theories as a broad starting point for the structure of dialogue, as employed within
restorative processes, the framework can thereafter be critiqued, revised, contextualized, and redefined
through the introduction of additional perspectives, theories, and ideas. The author wishes simply to
use Habermas' theories here in a limited way to provide a base or basic structure from which she and
others can sculpt, mould, and add additional layers of meaning.
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processes or oral traditions exist and even tend to dominate, are structured
in ways different from European or Western rational thought. Concepts
such as time, being, and the borders between the physical and spiritual are
very different in these cultures than as envisioned by Habermas, and yet
the "something significant" in restorative processes that take place within
these cultures is no less strong.
Despite these weaknesses, Habermas' theories have a great deal to
offer, especially to help us to conceptualize the structure of speech, and
thus the basic workings of restorative processes. Habermas' work can
be used to illuminate areas in restorative justice theory that have so far
remained ambiguous.
In this paper I will first provide an explanation of Habermas' theory of
universal pragmatics and communicative action, throughout which I will
make reference to the different ways these theories align with restorative
practices and experiences. Once I explain the theories, I will then explore
what Habermas describes as the learning and bonding potentials inherent
in communicative action. Finally, I conclude by tying these explanations
together in a framework that helps explain the linguistic structure at play
within the restorative process.'
I. Habermas'theories of universal pragmatics and communicative
action
To put things into the restorative justice context at this early point, let
me remind the reader that in restorative justice we start from a position
of conflict where there is a lack of understanding, consensus, 6 and
coordinated action. It is in fact the lack of both consensus and coordinated
action that leads to wrongdoings, crime, and conflict in the first place. We
require, therefore, a process to bring about understanding, consensus (i.e.,
general commitment regarding how best to peacefully move forward) and
coordinated action; a realignment of behaviour and right relationships (or
the right way to relate to one another) to restore peace.
5. Although the discussion within this paper tends to reference restorative justice processes used
within inter-personal conflict, it is suggested that the same broad principles, and the insights that arise
from them, hold true for restorative justice processes in more macro settings as well, such as conflicts
at the community, group, and nation level.
6. By "consensus," I mean a general commitment to basic norms and social rules that instruct and
inform behaviour in relation to inter-personal and social interaction.
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1. The role and function of language
According to Habermas, humans are rational, autonomous beings who
relate and interact with the world through language.' To Habermas,
language is much more than simply words and phrases. Not only does
it convey meaning by way of symbols, but through language we are
able, among other things, to relate to and influence others; establish
interpersonal relationships; come to understanding about the world,
others, and ourselves; and coordinate action.8 As such, Habermas' theories
are much more interested in what language does than what it says.9
More than anything, Habermas proposes that the function of language
is ultimately to reach understanding and coordinate action."o Habermas
acknowledges that we also use language to further conflict, competition,
and strategic action; however, to him these are simply derivatives of the
original goal of language, that of reaching understanding and coordinating
action." In other words, when two or more persons talk to each other they
do so predominately to align their understanding so they can synchronize
or organize their actions in a way that allows them to achieve their goal,
whatever that goal may be. Thinking of it in a different way, when an
individual speaks, they speak so as to be understood. People do not talk
so as not to be understood: to do so would be irrational. When we express
ourselves through speech then, we do so with the goal of being understood.
Once we are understood, and once we understand the person we are
speaking with, it can be said that we have reached a shared understanding
and consensus.12 Once we have reached this consensus, we can thereafter
act in a manner consistent with this shared understanding. The language
Habermas uses for this shared understanding, consensus, and resulting
7. Jtirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of
Society, vol 1, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984) at 8 [Habermas, Reason
and the Rationalization of Society].
8. Ibid; Jilrgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: The Critique of Functionalist
Reason, vol 2, translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) at 5, 120 [Habermas,
The Critique of Functionalist Reason].
9. James Finlayson, Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press,
2005) at 32; Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas 's Pragmatics (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1994) at 3.
10. Jilrgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution ofSociety, translated by Thomas McCarthy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1979) ch 1, "What is Universal Pragmatics," at 1 [Habermas, Communication
and Evolution]; Habermas, The Critique ofFunctionalist Reason, supra note 8 at 5; Finlayson, supra
note 9 at 34.
I1. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 1.
12. Habermas, The Critique ofFunctionalist Reason, supra note 8 at 120; Finlayson, supra note 9 at
34.
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coordination of action is "mutual intersubjectivity" or "intersubjective
recognition of the validity claim the speaker raises.""
If Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics at its core is a theory
of communication that explains how we use speech to come to a shared
understanding, consensus, and to coordinate action, one can, even at this
initial stage, see how this will be beneficial to explain the restorative
justice encounter, that is: a dialogue process that is conducted as a means
to express thoughts, feelings, and experiences, understand what happened,
as well as the consequences of actions, and to come to a consensus and
formal agreement regarding how best to address the harm caused.
2. The three-world concept1 4
To understand how language gives rise to a shared understanding and
the coordination of action, we need to first explore Habermas' concept of
"the three worlds." In his book, The Theory of Communicative Action,"
Habermas draws on the work of renowned psychologist Jean Piaget and
explains that as we grow and develop as individuals, through the various
developmental stages articulated by Piaget, we come to divide reality into
three different realms or dimensions: the objective, subjective, and social
worlds. 16 According to Piaget, a child comes to understand the difference
and the demarcation between the concrete physical world that she lives
in and the internal world of her thoughts, feelings, and desires. As a child
deals over time with objects and with herself, this line becomes more and
more clear. Additionally, the child makes the distinction between these
first two realms and the third realm of the shared social world. As the child
interacts with others, and sees others interacting with the physical world,
this understanding of the social world forms, and again the demarcation
becomes strengthened.17
Beyond understanding the separation between these three worlds,
children come to understand that they can view the world from a variety of
perspectives. Initially, they only engage the world from their own internal
perspective; that is, they only acknowledge that the world can be seen
through their eyes: how they see themselves, how they see others, and how
they see the physical world. Over time, however, they come to realize that
the "worlds" can be seen from other subjective perspectives; that is, you
13. Habermas, The Critique ofFunctionalist Reason, supra note 8 at 120.
14. According to Habermas: "Speaker and hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an
interpretive framework within which they work out their common situation definitions," ibid at 120.
15. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7.
16. Ibid at 52, 68; Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 120.
17. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at 68; Habermas,
Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 66-67.
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can see the world from someone else's perspective or through someone
else's eyes. Other sociologists have expressed this perspective as "taking
the attitude of the other,"'" that is, the self can see themselves through
another's eyes (alter); they can see the other through the other's eyes; they
can see the interaction between self and other through another's eyes (third
person); and they can see the physical world through another's eyes.19 As
children grow they also become more reflective. Taking the perspective
of themselves (or other) and looking back on their own thoughts and
behaviour.
This ability to take various perspectives or "take the attitude of the
other" is an important mechanism within the restorative process. It is what
allows parties to empathize with others, and metaphorically stand in the
shoes of another when the different parties are "telling their stories." This
in turn has been linked to the ability to come to understanding with another.
Being able to see things from the other's perspective and comprehend
what that may feel like (which is possible because they too have felt these
things or can at least imagine such feelings given the situation) is part of
the understanding of which restorative practitioners often speak.20 Once
participants are able to stand in another's shoes, the ability to reflect back
on their own thoughts, feelings and behaviour is also key.
The recognition of the above-noted separate realities or three worlds is
important to Habermas because he suggests that we use language slightly
differently depending on the realm with which we are engaging.21 In other
words, what language achieves, or the work language does, depends on
what "world" we are talking about. For example, when we use language to
relate to the objective world, the role language plays is to represent facts
that exist (i.e., "the flower is green"). When we use language to relate
to the subjective world, the role language plays is to express our inner
intentions (i.e., "I like the flower" or "I want to eat now"). And when we
use language to relate to the social world, we use language to establish
legitimate interpersonal relationships or establish appropriate behavioural
18. Habermas, Functionalist Reason, supra note 8 at 9-15 and 37 for Habermas' exploration of
Mead's "taking the attitude of the other."
19. Ibid at 35; Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7 at 69.
20. Jennifer J Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework (Ottawa:
Law Commission of Canada, 1998) at 51.
21. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 28-29 and 33.
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expectations (i.e., "I really appreciate you Laura" or "What you did was
inappropriate, Brad").22
Furthermore, being able to take the different perspectives described
above is also necessary for us to use language in these ways. To come
ultimately to understanding about facts, intentions and appropriate
behavioural expectations, it is necessary to be able to not only see things
through your eyes, but also to envision how the individual you are talking
to is perceiving each of the three worlds. That is, in order to come to
understanding and coordinate action, you must understand how you view
the facts, intentions, and norms, as well as how another party views facts,
intentions, and norms. Only when this is understood can the positions be
synchronized and actions coordinated.23
In relating this back to the restorative justice process, each of these
functions of language corresponding to the three worlds is essential. First,
it is important within an encounter for each of the parties directly involved
to discuss what actually happened in terms of facts (objective world,
asking the question "What happened?").24 Secondly, it is also important
for each of the participants to express their inner feelings and intentions to
let others know how they feel, what effect the wrongdoing had on them,
what they want done about it, and what they can do to make it better
(subjective world, asking questions such as "How has it affected you?" or
"What were you thinking at the time and how did it make you feel?"). 25
Finally, at the heart of every encounter is the aim of acknowledging wrongs
that have occurred, establishing appropriate behavioural expectations, and
developing legitimate interpersonal relationships (shared, social world,
asking questions such as "How did the behaviour affect others?" or "Who
was harmed?"). When all of these things have been addressed, it is the
larger goal of a restorative justice process to reach an agreement regarding
what actions should be taken to repair the harm and establish right
relationships for all those involved.26 Additionally, in order to come to this
understanding and agreement, it is necessary not only for each individual
22. Ibid at 28 and 67; Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7 at 68, 69,
278. It should be noted that in fact in every speech act there exists a threefold relationship between the
utterance, the external world, the internal world, and the shared social world by way of the existence
of all three validity claims in each utterance. However, given that each speech act thematizes only one
validity claim, the function of speech differs depending on which validity claim or which "world" is
emphasized; see, Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 67.
23. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7 at 12-13 and 69-70.
24. International Institute For Restorative Practices, Restorative Questions I & II (Bethlehem: The
IIRP Bookstore, 2011).
25. Ibid.
26. Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Waterloo: Herald Press,
1995).
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participant to view these three worlds from their own perspective, but
it is necessary for each participant to see things from each of the other
participants' perspective: only then can there be a shared understanding
and consensus or agreement 27 on how best to move forward or make things
better.
3. Validity claims and argumentation
Once we realize that we think and approach our reality from these different
worlds and from these different perspectives (self, other or alter, and third
party), we can then explore Habermas' next layer that further explains the
specific structures in speech that allow us to come to an understanding
with each other, and organize and coordinate our behaviour or actions.
First, Habermas explains that dialogue can be broken down into the
smallest unit of speech, which he calls an "utterance" or "speech act."28
Our conversations are made up of hundreds of these discreet speech
acts. Second, Habermas asserts that within every one of these utterances
or speech acts we raise "validity claims." 29 Validity claims are simply
claims that what we are saying is legitimate or applicable. According to
Habermas, whenever we speak, we raise three inherent validity claims:
truth, sincerity, and rightness.3 0 By raising these validity claims, every
time we utter a phrase, we are in essence asking those with whom we
are engaged in speech to accept: 1) what we are saying is true; 2) that the
intentions and feelings we are expressing are sincere and truthful-that
they can be trusted; and 3) that what we are saying (and hence thinking) is
normatively right or appropriate.31 Habermas calls these explicit or implicit
assertions "validity claims" because we are asking those we are engaged
in speech with to accept the claims we are raising. When we implicitly
offer these validity claims within our conversations (within each discreet
27. Within many restorative justice processes, a final agreement (often in written form) is formed at
the conclusion of the encounter(s) to capture agreed upon terms of action for the future. These terms are
generally commitments of actions the wrongdoer will undertake to demonstrate accountability for the
wrong, but can also include commitments by anyone present to facilitate right relations going forward
in the future. The use of the term consensus here, and in other places within this paper, generally refers
to these agreements or commitments for future actions, conduct or behavioural expectations in relation
to inter-personal or social relations. It is not necessary that parties be in consensus as to the facts of the
case. Each participant may have their own story of what happened and why. Further, it is not necessary
that there be consensus on all values and attitudes held by each party. Understanding of one another,
that is understanding of these various stories, values, and attitudes, can come through the restorative
process, but consensus is generally not needed except in an agreement as to how to move forward.
28. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 1-2, 26 and 31.
29. Ibid at 2, 28.
30. Ibid at 2-3, 28-33. There is in fact a fourth validity claim that is raised in each speech act, that
of comprehensibility. We expect or claim that each of our utterances is understandable, however, this
claim seems to be so basic that Habermas does not dwell on it for any great length
31. Ibid at 2-3, 28, 32-33.
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speech act), we are asking the person we are speaking with to take a yes or
no position to the claim we have offered. "Yes," you accept my claims, or
"no" you do not.32 This can also be done implicitly by "going along" with
another, or explicitly by verbalizing the agreement.
Habermas' validity claims fit with the practice of restorative justice
in that there are underlying principles of openness, truth-telling, respect,
and accountability within the process. These principles translate into
practice by encouraging open and honest expression (truth, truthfulness
or sincerity, and rightness). In fact the expression of all thoughts and
emotions are welcomed as long as they are expressed with respect,
sincerity, and truthfulness. When expression is not open and honest,
persons within the process are encouraged to hold each other to account.
The restorative justice process is a place where parties can confront one
another, get questions answered, and gain insight. As described by Van
Ness and Strong:
Parties put together a common understanding of what happened and
talk about how they experienced and how it made them feel. ...Both
are given the opportunity to ask questions of the other, the victim can
speak about the personal dimensions of the victimization and loss and
the offender has a chance to express remorse. ...[it] gives them greater
insight into the harm they caused. ...Both victim and offender are
confronted with the other as a person rather than a faceless, antagonistic
force, permitting them to gain a greater understanding of the crime, of
the other's circumstances and of what it will take to make things right."
Returning to Habermas' theories, you might notice that these validity
claims correspond with the three worlds explained above. For example,
the claim that a speech act is true relates to facts in the physical or external
world. Only facts can be true: feelings and intentions that arise from within
us, on the other hand, can be sincere or truthful. Finally, utterances that can
be claimed to be right or normatively appropriate come from our shared
or social world. How we relate to one another or behave with one another
can be appropriate, as opposed to true or truthful.34
Thomas McCarthy summarizes this interconnection of validity claims
and worlds nicely:
32. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7 at 38: "every new utterance is
a test: the definition of the situation implicitly proposed by the speaker is either confirmed, modified,
partly suspended, or generally placed in question." Habermas, The Critique of Functionalist Reason,
supra note 8 at 121.
33. Van Ness & Strong, "Meaning of Restorative Justice," supra note 1 at 70.
34. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 28-33.
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In speaking we relate to the world about us, to other subjects, to our
own intentions, feelings, and desires. In each of these dimensions we are
constantly making claims, even if usually only implicitly, concerning the
validity of what we are saying, implying, or presupposing-claims, for
instance, regarding the truth of what we say in relation to the objective
world; or claims concerning the rightness, appropriateness, or legitimacy
of our speech acts in relation to the shared values and norms of our social
lifeword; or claims to sincerity or authenticity in regard to the manifest
expressions of our intentions and feelings."
Although all three validity claims exist in each utterance spoken, that is,
in everything we say, Habermas suggests that within each speech act one
validity claim is actually emphasized or "thematized" above the others. 6
That is, we usually make facts, intentions and feelings, or norms and
interpersonal relations explicit or centrally thematic. For example, when
a victim within an encounter explains that the offender hit him in the
stomach, the victim is emphasizing or thematizing the propositional or truth
(objective) element of the statement. The victim is still raising the sincerity
and normative claims within such a statement; however, such claims
remain implicit or in the background, while the truth claim is explicitly
thematized. When the victim suggests, however, that he was frightened
when he was hit by the offender, the victim is instead emphasizing or
thematizing the expressive (subjective) element of his statement. Again,
the other validity claims are raised, but they remain implicit, whereas the
expressive validity claim is clearly explicit. Finally, when the offender's
mother, in response to hearing an account of the events, tells the offender
that he was wrong to have struck the victim, and that he should apologize
and never do such a thing again, the interactive or normative element of
the utterance is being thematized. In each of these utterances, the three
validity claims are being raised and offered to be taken as accepted; it is
simply that one of the three claims has been made explicit, whereas the
other claims are only indirectly expressed.37
Relating this aspect of Habermas' theory to a restorative encounter, it is
interesting to note that this thematization seems to occur at two levels within
a face-to-face process. First, this thematization can be seen in individual
speech acts within the dialogue that occurs in the encounter, such as those
I have provided as examples above. Second, the thematization can also
35. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at xii, "Translator's
Introduction."
36. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 53-59 and 66; Habermas,
Functionalist Reason, supra note 8 at 120.
37. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 53-59; Habermas, Functionalist
Reason, supra note 8 at 120-12 1.
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be seen on a larger scale within the various phases of an encounter, where
the subject-matter and overall discussion seems to be thematized around
specific claims. For example, at the commencement of most encounter
processes, participants begin by recounting the facts that surrounded the
incident at the center of the restorative justice process. This phase of the
encounter can be said to be centered on, or emphasize, truth claims. Of
course, there may be speech acts within this phase that thematize other
validity claims, but generally most of the speech during this phase
emphasizes truth claims about what happened. The second phase of many
encounter sessions focuses on how people felt and the harm they may have
experienced as a result of the incident. This phase of the encounter could
therefore be said to emphasize truthfulness or sincerity claims. The final
phase of the encounter process focuses on what can be done to repair the
harm and restore the relationships that have been damaged. This phase of
the encounter process seems then to emphasize the normative or rightness
claim."
So far, we have seen that dialogue can be divided into discreet
speech acts that have a structure implicit to them that corresponds to the
objective, subjective, and social world, and that universally inherent in
these speech acts are validity claims of truth, sincerity, and rightness.
Although all three of these claims are raised in each speech act, only one
claim gets emphasized or thematized at any given time.39 This theoretical
basis is important, however, the key to Habermas' theory, and what allows
individuals to come to understanding with each other through language,
is that validity claims are raised as 'claims (as opposed to absolutes).4 0
Because these claims are not absolute, but are instead simply assertions
or propositions, they are open to be challenged, criticized, defended and
revised through a process Habermas refers to as "argumentation." 41
For every utterance, validity claims are raised; therefore, whenever
we engage in dialogue, a hearer has three possible courses of action upon
hearing an utterance: 1) they may accept the statement and the validity
38. There is time to talk about the facts, about how people feel, and about what wrongs were
committed and how such wrongs should be rectified. Although there is a natural rhythm within an
encounter process that often flows from facts, to feelings, to restoring relationships, an encounter is
never fully compartmentalized. At any time during the dialogue participants can express speech acts
that thematize any of the three validity claims
39. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 66; Habermas, The Critique of
Functionalist Reason, supra note 8 at 120.
40. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 63; Habermas, Reason and the
Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7 at 9.
41. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 64; Habermas, Reason and the
Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at 22-42.
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claims associated with it (take a "yes" or acceptance position in relation
to the claims raised); 2) they may reject the statement and challenge the
claims made (take a "no" or rejection position to the claims raised)-it is
at this stage that the process of argumentation is then engaged4 2; or 3) they
may leave the issue undecided.4 3
If a hearer accepts an utterance and validity claim as offered, there
is no challenge, and thus no justification required. It is assumed that the
parties both agree with the claim, and there is understanding and agreement
with what was said. If, on the other hand, the hearer does not accept that
claim as offered, the speaker must provide justification as to why the claim
should be accepted. It is at this point that the claim can be said to be
problematized and challenged, and the speaker is expected to offer reasons
for why the hearer should accept the statement as true, sincere, or right. If
the speaker can justify, defend, and ground their claim with reasons, the
discourse ends with an agreement that the claim raised was valid. If, on the
other hand, the hearer continues to reject and challenge the claim made,
the discourse or "argument"" continues with the offering and criticizing of
reasons, or the parties may decide to leave the issue undecided for the time
being.45 Such argumentation continues until the criticized validity claims
are vindicated through reasons, unless left undecided.
This corresponds again with my comments earlier regarding the
underlying principle of accountability within the restorative process. If
what is said by one party is not seen to be true, sincere, or right, others
within the process are expected to hold the party accountable and challenge
the individual. If the speaker can say why what he said was in fact true,
sincere, or right, then others come to understand and continue on to other
issues. If no adequate reasons are given by the speaker then he or she is
expected, by the others holding the speaker accountable, to reflect and
change his or her position.
When one "grounds a claim," as Habermas calls it, one is simply
providing a justification, or pointing to the appropriate evidence that
42. Ibid at 18.
43. Ibid at 38.
44. It should be noted that this process of argumentation does not need to be a sophisticated process.
Nor do the positions taken by the hearer need to be made explicit. For example, the hearer obviously
is not likely to say, "John, I do not accept the validity claim of sincerity you have offered." And often
times, individuals do not even explicitly state the rejection in a manner such as: "John you're being
insincere." Often times instead, the acceptance or rejection of a validity claim, and the speech act it
was raised within, is implicit and subtle in the hearer's response. Additionally, the terminology that
Habermas uses, "argumentation," conjures up images of a yelling match. Other terms, such as debate
or deliberate, could be employed here and may convey the meaning in a better way. Regardless of what
term is used, however, the process is still the same and often occurs in subtle, rudimentary ways.
45. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at 25, 38-39.
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supports the claim. This "grounding" takes slightly different forms
depending on the validity claim being challenged and defended. For
example, in order to ground or justify a truth claim, one must establish the
existence of a state of affairs, that is, give evidence that a fact is indeed
this, as opposed to that. In order to ground a claim of rightness, one must
establish the acceptability of actions or norms, or establish the preference
of a particular value, that is, give evidence that supports the action taken
in a given situation in light of legitimate expectations. As for a claim of
sincerity, Habermas suggests that such claims cannot be grounded per
se, but instead only demonstrated. To demonstrate sincerity, one must
establish the transparency of self-presentation or, in other words, show
that they can be trusted by acting in a consistent manner.4 6 Although each
claim requires a slightly different type of reason to be grounded, each
claim is nonetheless justified with reasons.
It is this process of argumentation-criticism of validity claims raised,
followed by a justification or grounding of the claim through reasons-
that is the structure at the heart of individuals coming to understanding
and coordinating their action, and is thus suggested to be the structure at
the heart of encounter as well. This raising and debating of validity claims
allows for what Habermas terms "intersubj ectivity" or mutual agreement.47
In summary, the process of validating a claim involves: 1) a problematic
utterance in which a certain thematized validity claim is raised and
challenged; 2) a grounding or defending of the raised validity claim with
reasons; 3) a testing of those reasons to determine if the claim rightfully
stands or not; and 4) (a) potentially modifying or rejecting the claim if the
grounding proved insufficient, or (b) accepting the claim as valid based on
the reasons given. If the result of this process is the last alternative-i.e.,
accepting the claim as valid based on the reasons given-then it can be
said that the parties have come to understanding through intersubjectively
recognizing the validity claims raised. 48
In a discourse like a restorative justice encounter, when all parties are
engaging in speaking and listening, this process repeats itself over and
over again (either acceptance of a validity claim, a rejection of a claim
which results in argumentation, or a neutral reaction to leave the claim
unchallenged and undecided for the time being) as the parties work
through different issues and topics, and understanding is achieved through
46. Ibid at 15, 25, 39, 41.
47. Ibid at 14, 25, 27, 35, 50; Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 63.
48. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at 25-26; Habermas,
Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 121.
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intersubjectively recognizing validity claims the parties reciprocally
raise.49
As seen throughout this discussion, the process of coming to
understanding through intersubjectively recognizing validity claims fits
squarely with the process involved in restorative justice encounters and
is a good perspective from which to understand how individuals come to
understanding and are able to emphasize and stand in each other's shoes.
Although Habermas terms the process of questioning and defending
validity claims "argumentation," it is important to remember that there is
nothing forceful or aggressive about the process. It is based entirely on the
giving and accepting (or challenging) of reasons. No force or coercion is
permitted, other than the force of the stronger argument or better reasons.so
Because the restorative justice process is meant to be an open process
where participants are free to speak their minds in a respectful manner, if
someone disagrees with the statement of another, whether in regards to the
truth of the statement, the sincerity of the statement, or the appropriateness
of the statement, the encounter not only allows for, but also encourages
that person to freely disagree with and challenge what the other says
(hold to account). This is exactly what Habermas describes as criticisable
validity claims and argumentation. The encounter is an open forum to
express oneself, challenge others respectfully and defend one's thoughts
and beliefs with reason through discourse."
II. Communicative action and the experiences of learning and bonding
within the restorative justice process
In addition to helping us think about how understanding, empathy (standing
in another's shoes), and agreement (in relation to future actions and inter-
relations) are achieved through the restorative process, Habermas' theory
49. Ibid at 121-122.
50. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at 25-28. Indeed, "power
imbalances" among participants in restorative processes, which may result in a weaker party
purportedly agreeing with a "restorative" outcome while having silent reservations, is an important
issue and concern within restorative justice processes that must actively be addressed and managed
within each process.
51. It may be good to remind the reader at this point of the weaknesses of Habermas' theories as
outlined in the introduction, and reiterate that the arguments contained within this paper are offered as
one perspective from which to reflect on current practice. The author acknowledges fully the idealistic
nature of these arguments and acknowledges too the complex nature and dynamics of discourse, that
includes issues of power, status, gender oppression, cultural etiquette, emotions, fears, insecurities,
politics, etc., that are not dealt with in Habermas' concepts of universal pragmatics and communicative
action. Habermas does attempt to address many of these issues in The Inclusion of the Other: Studies
in Political Theory, Ciaran Cronin & Pablo de Greif, eds, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). All of
these dynamics, however, could not be addressed in this initial discussion; hence the offer that this
discussion is written simply as a starting point to lay out an initial perspective and structure of dialogue
that will have to be further developed and refined.
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may also help us begin to think about other gaps that exist in restorative
justice theory, including understanding how the learning and bonding
that is observed in the restorative process may come about. According to
Habermas, when communicative action is employed (i.e., the raising of
a criticisable validity claim, followed by a justification or grounding of
the claim through reasons with no force other than the force of the better
argument), both a learning and a bonding potential exist.
1. Learning potential
Because validity claims are subject to challenge and need to be defended,
or at least be defendable, the process of argumentation provides a space for
claims to be altered and improved if in their original form they fail (that
is, we can correct failed attempts). Argumentation thus allows participants
the opportunity to learn52 ; that is, identify mistakes or failed claims and
improve upon them based on valid reasons given. For example, if a hearer
challenges a validity claim, and the speaker cannot defend it with reasons,
according to Habermas the claim should be modified or abandoned. If the
hearer offers reasons in her challenge, it is more likely that the claim can
be modified to one that can be grounded by the hearer's reasons. If no
reasons exist to sustain even a modified claim, the claim should simply be
abandoned. Habermas suggests that in cases where there are no reasons
to ground a claim and it is not modified or abandoned, the speaker who
put forth the claim deceives him- or herself and can be said to be acting
irrationally."
Through this learning process of abandoning or modifying
unsustainable claims, individuals acquire insight and overcome self-
deception and difficulties in comprehension. This process of abandoning
or modifying claims that are not justified results in a transformation in
thinking and "knowing." The learning potential in discourse based solely
on the strength of reasons is likely a core element of the so-called "magic"
that can be witnessed in the encounter. Although not "magic," the act
of individuals modifying their claims, as well as their corresponding
behaviour, so that they can come to mutual understanding and coordinate
action through intersubjectively recognizing validity claims is nonetheless
rather extraordinary.
The repeated stories of changes in attitude "in which the victim and
offender recognize within the other a common humanity"5 4 as well as the
idea that the restorative process is "able to touch-and perhaps change
52. Habermas, Reason and the Rationalization ofSociety, supra note 7 at 25.
53. Ibid at 18-19, 22.
54. Johnstone & Van Ness, "Meaning of Restorative Justice," supra note 1 at 16.
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the hearts and minds of offenders (and, coincidentally, of victims)"" may
be explained in part by this modifying or abandoning of unsustained
validity claims.
If this is, in fact, one of the mechanisms at play within the restorative
process, then it can give us a potential starting place to begin to address
Bazemore's concern that "we cannot easily explain why such short
term encounters might change... attitude, behaviour and/or... impacts
lawbreaking"" as well as some idea of the "something significant" that
McCold suggests occurs. 7
2. Binding or bonding force
In addition to the learning potential that is present in communicative
action, Habermas suggests there is also a bonding potential (that creates
an obligatory relationship between speaker and hearer) that exists in this
type of speech. On one level, the raising of validity claims brings about
an interpersonal relationship that is bound together by the reciprocal
obligation of each speaker to justify or ground the claims he or she has
raised, and for hearers to accept these claims unless they have good reasons
to challenge them. Habermas refers to this as the illocutionary or rationally
motivated binding force of communicative action." Each participant
implicitly offers a "warranty" that if challenged, they can provide reasons
to support the claim raised. An individual in this case is bound then by
the requirement that she act rationally. If she raised a validity claim, she
must (i.e., she has the obligation to, based in rationality) provide reasons
that support that claim, and a hearer too must accept such claims, (i.e.,
she has an obligation to accept such claims, unless she has good reasons
to reject them).59 Furthermore, based on the reasons provided within
the testing of validity claims, the illocutionary binding effect results in
a speaker regarding a question as settled when a satisfactory answer is
given, dropping an assertion when it proves to be false, and following his
own advice when he finds himself in the same situation as the hearer.6 0
Above and beyond the illocutionary force of speech, Habermas'
communicative action allows for a second kind of bonding to occur. On
55. Maxwell, supra note 1 at 11.
56. Gordon Bazemore, "Restorative Justice and the Offender: The Challenge of Reintegration"
in Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff, eds, Restorative Community Justice (Cincinnati: Anderson
Publishing, 2001) at 110-111.
57. McCold, supra note 3 at 359.
58. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 41-62 and 63; Habermas, Reason
and the Rationalization of Society, supra note 7 at 34 and 278.
59. Cooke, supra note 9 at 12-13.
60. Habermas, Communication and Evolution, supra note 10 at 62-64.
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this second level, individuals are bound due to the need to act consistently
in regards to normative or regulative speech acts agreed to or accepted
within dialogue. If a speaker has, for example, commanded or directed
a hearer to do something, and the hearer has accepted (i.e., accepted the
normative validity claim raised in the speech act), the hearer is morally
obliged to comply with the command or directive. If, on the other hand,
the speaker has, for example, made a promise or an announcement and
the hearer has accepted (i.e., again accepted the normative validity claim
raised), the speaker this time is bound morally to act in a manner consistent
with the promise or announcement made. Similar moral obligations also
appear when dealing with agreements, contracts, advice and warnings. 6 1
At both levels, relationships are established or re-established through
this bonding potential because as parties engage in communicative action
and come to agreement over and over again on truth, sincerity and rightness
claims, they begin to form a common understanding and "knowing" of each
other. They know what each other is thinking, feeling, and experiencing
because they are agreeing on the thoughts, feelings, and values through the
claims raised. Furthermore, parties begin to trust one another as a result of
their coordinated action and their compliance with agreed upon normative
or regulative speech acts. If we agree as a group to behave in a certain
manner and comply with this agreement, then trust will be built. If we do
not comply, we feel the guilt that comes from others holding us to account.
It is this "knowing," trusting, and being able to hold to account in the
process, that give rise to strengthened social relationships.
Each aspect of this binding or bonding potential seems to align with
the experiences of restorative justice participants and practitioners. For
example, the compliance with agreed upon normative or regulative speech
acts seems to accord with the experience given by Johnstone:
Proponents of restorative justice claim that people are far more likely to
do things they have agreed to do, than to do things which they have been
ordered to do. 62
Furthermore, according to McCold and Wachtel:
61. Ibid at 63. It may be good to remind the reader here that, although I am speaking of individual
speakers and hearers throughout the discussion, within the restorative process there are numerous
participants, and thus numerous speakers and hearers who each individually take their turns in these
roles as the process takes place.
62. Gerry Johnstone, Restorative Justice: Ideas, Values, Debates (Cullompton, UK: Willan
Publishing, 2002) at 136.
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For community justice initiative to be effective they must capitalize
on the fact that people act in a certain way because they want to avoid
experiencing the external shame of disapproval by people they care about
and because of the internal shame experienced through conscience."
In terms of the increase in knowing and trusting leading in turn to
strengthened social relationships, as Kay Pranis notes:
Because restorative values emphasize those characteristics that support
good relationships, the application of those values continuously
strengthens relationships and deepens the connections among people.
When people experience respect, equality and mutual care they become
more likely to drop defences or protections, which are often the course
of destructive or non-cooperative behaviour. They become open to
recognizing common ground and acting in the common interest-a
critical aspect of community."
Habermas' bonding or binding potential may also then be an element
of the so-called "magic" that takes place in encounter.
Whereas the transformative power of speech allows individuals
within an encounter to learn and grow in their thinking and "knowing,"
the binding power of speech allows individuals within an encounter to
become connected to one another, to come into relationships not only based
on collectively coming to a common understanding about a situation, but
also collectively coming to mutual agreement on thoughts, feelings, and
behaviour.
III. Explaining the restorative encounter process
Knowing that Habermas' theories are offered here solely as a beginning
perspective to help us start to understand the encounter process, I nonetheless
believe that his articulation of universal pragmatics and communicative
action in relation to restorative justice theory and practice can provide
a framework and an explanation of structures within speech that help us
begin to understand how we relate to one another with language and how
we are able to come to a more shared understanding of the world.
1. Framework to understand the restorative encounter process
The ultimate goal of a restorative justice encounter process is for the
parties to come to understanding with each other, come to consensus and
agreement on what actions can be taken to right the wrong, address the
63. Paul McCold & Benjamin Wachtel, "Community Is Not a Place: A New Look at Community
Justice Initiatives" in John Perry, ed, Repairing Communities Through Restorative Justice (Lanham:
American Counseling Association, 2002) at 42.
64. Kay Pranis, "Restorative Values" in Johnson & Van Ness, supra note 1.
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harm that has been caused, and then finally to coordinate their actions
so that this agreement can be fulfilled and the parties can move forward.
Along the way, within this process, individuals get the chance to confront
and challenge each other, learn from each other, and try to establish right
relationships of equal dignity, respect, and care. 65 This is done through a
dialogue process that brings together all the parties with a stake in the issue.
According to Habermas, the ultimate function of language, when used in
the form of communicative action, is to bring individuals to understanding
and coordinate their action. As you can see, Habermas' framework of
communicative action aligns almost perfectly with what occurs within a
restorative justice encounter process.
First, it is important to acknowledge that Habermas' theories deal with
speech and discourse, which are at the heart of every restorative justice
process. By applying the speech act theory and Habermas' discourse
framework to the encounter process, it can be said that each participant
raises the three validity claims every time they speak within the restorative
process. As mentioned above, the first phase of the encounter process is
the recounting of each participant's story of the event in question. As such,
when each participant speaks about what happened (recounts their story
about what happened)66 they are raising the three validity claims in each of
their speech acts, that is they are claiming that what they are saying about
the event is true, that they are being sincere, and what they are saying
about the event is normatively appropriate in the context. Despite raising
all three claims, they are predominately thematizing the truth claim,
while the others remain in the background, being raised implicitly. Each
participant takes their turn explaining the situation and raising their claims
with each utterance, but at the same time have the opportunity to question
or challenge the others' claims regarding what happened in a space of
open and honest dialogue, holding each other accountable. Discussion
ensues and through the discourse, claims are raised, questioned and argued
(giving of reasons), or agreed upon and accepted. There is meant to be
no coercion or force within this process other than the force of the better
argument. Through the process of argumentation, participants may come
to gradually agree on a common definition of the situation if validity claims
65. Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 20 at 1, 39, 71.
66. See also Habermas' comments on narrative: Habermas, The Critique of Functionalist Reason,
supra note 8 at 136.
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are accepted and not left unresolved67 ; in this case, a general common
definition of the facts of the incident.
Participants are also asked about how the incident made them feel,
the consequences of the harm, and the impact on their lives. Each time
they speak, they are again raising all three validity claims, but are now
predominately thematizing the expressive claim-speaking about their
subjective world. It is during this aspect of the process that all the parties
can express their needs, desires, and feelings. Victims are able to make
fully known the nature and extent of his or her injuries. Upon hearing
the consequences of their actions on the victim and the community, the
offender may express regret and remorse because he or she is able to take
the attitude of the other and see their subjective world experience through
the victim's eyes. Through accepting, criticizing, and engaging in argument
regarding the claims raised, the parties begin to come to understanding
regarding the others' subjective world.68
Throughout this process, speakers will thematize normative claims
as well, either in regards to discussing the wrong at the center of the
restorative justice process or when articulating thoughts, statements, or
behaviours that they feel should be identified as inappropriate. Although
the encounter focuses on a specific event or wrong that can be thematized
and discussed, the process also encourages participants to consider the
surrounding context. Thematized normative claims are also raised when
the discussion turns to what is needed to right the wrong.
As a result of being able to criticize claims raised, challenge thoughts,
feelings, values, and behaviours present in the process, individuals
are able to challenge: 1) false beliefs about what happened and why it
happened, 2) stereotypes and prejudices regarding other persons in the
process and how they feel, and 3) norms. Through this participants come
to an understanding with one another and coordinate their action so as to
fulfill the agreement they have reached.
Furthermore, this challenging and criticizing of claims gives rise to
the learning potential Habermas.refers to. That is, individuals modify or
abandon claims (thoughts, feelings, and values) that are unsustainable. When
thoughts, feelings, and values are challenged and there exist no reasons to
67. It should be noted that it is not necessary for there to be full agreement on the facts of the
incident within a restorative process, although this can occur if validity claims are accepted. Often
there are differences, where each party has their own story or version of events. What is needed is a
general agreement or a common starting place regarding what occurred. This is often achieved when
the prerequisite, of offenders taking responsibility for their actions, is met (i.e., an acceptance that the
offender was present and did commit certain acts).
68. Again, full understanding of each other's subjective worlds is not necessarily expected, but a
general understanding of how the parties may have felt as a result of the incident often occurs.
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justify or ground them, logically they must be changed or discarded. As
mentioned this results in a change in thinking and "knowing" and can
help individuals acquire insight, overcome self-deception and difficulties
in comprehension. So when an offender is faced with a victim who gives
reasons that demonstrate that they are not insured, are not wealthy, or have
great financial responsibility and grew up in the same neighbourhood with
the same socio-economic conditions and challenges as the offender, the
offender's original thoughts and feelings of "she could afford it," "he is
insured," "these people aren't like us," 6 9 should be modified or abandoned.
A change in thought, attitude and, potentially, behaviour can therefore take
place as learning occurs and claims are modified or abandoned throughout
the restorative process.
Another element that fits into this change is the suggestion that we
approach facts, feelings, and values from a variety of perspectives. That
is, we can see these three worlds through another's eyes. We can stand
in the shoes of another and see their own perspective of facts, their own
feelings, and values. Furthermore, we can even stand outside ourselves
and imagine what others believe we think, feel, and believe. This ability to
take perspectives of another along with the process of argumentation that
results in the learning or transformative potential allows us to more deeply
come to understanding and achieve an intersubjectivity that can give rise
to empathy and changes in the "hearts and minds" of participants.
Finally, what keeps participants true to not only the process of
justifying claims through reasons, but also to the normative and regulative
claims they have agreed to as well as the ultimate agreements they have
reached is what Habermas refers to as the binding or bonding potential.
As parties repeatedly agree on validity claims, as mentioned, in particular
the normative and regulative claims, a knowing and trusting of each other
can grow and with it so does the strengthening of relationships within the
process.
In the last phase of the process once a general common understanding
is established regarding the objective world (facts), the subjective world
(feelings and intentions), and the social world (normative rights and
wrongs, and what is needed to right the wrong) in relation to the particular
event in question, the parties can then determine what agreement they
can come to so as to coordinate their action in terms establishing right
relationships regarding those involved.
69. Maxwell, supra note I at 11.
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2. The sigmficance ofHabermas'theories for restorativejustice
Habermas' theories provide us with a language and framework to be able
to articulate and explain phenomena that practitioners "knew when they
saw them." I propose that it is a promising framework, albeit one that
requires further research, testing, and articulation.
Having this framework is important in that it allows us to contribute
to the theory by beginning to provide deeper meaning to the different
elements of the encounter process. Habermas' theories, albeit with their
limitations, give us the framework to understand the pragmatic side of
language, that is, what work language does within the restorative justice
process. Most importantly it allows us to begin to articulate how language
permits and fosters coming to understanding, learning, the establishment of
interpersonal relationships, coming to mutual agreement, and coordinating
our actions and behaviours, all essential elements in restorative justice
thinking.
Habermas' framework therefore provides us with at least one possible
explanation of the structure of dialogue and basic workings within
the restorative process. It helps us start to understand the "something
significant" that practitioners suggest they know when they see it, but to
date have difficulty explaining.
